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Ten Years of Kentucky Domestic
Relations Law, 1955-1965
By FREDERICK W. WHITESIDE, JR.*
Editors Note-This article is a follow up of an article which ap-
peared ten years ago in volume forty-four of the Kentucky Law Jour-
nal. In that article a survey was made of five years of domestic
relations law in Kentucky. This present article covers a more extensive
period of a decade and is more comprehensive. It attempts to analyze
the present state of the law, discern the trends, and evaluate the law
in light of current sociological concepts.
The fall, 1955, issue of this Journal, devoted to recent develop-
ments in Kentucky law, includes a survey of significant Court of
Appeals decisions in domestic relations matters during the five
year period 1950-1955. This article is designed to continue that
survey, noting both significant court decisions and legislative
changes from 1955 to 1965. Though several hundred appellate
judicial opinions and numerous new statutes are acknowledged,
no attempt is made to be exhaustive. Rather it is sought to discuss
significant statutes and cases in context with the hope that the
attorney in Kentucky may view the trends and developments as a
whole. It is also intended to exclude from coverage certain de-
velopments related to family law but more often thought to fall
under the headings of criminal law, torts and contracts. For ex-
ample, developments in areas such as sex crimes, emancipation,
liabilities and immunities of parents and children in tort or con-
tract are not discussed. Also beyond the function of this type
article is a thorough discussion and comprehensive interdis-
ciplinary treatment of family law reform proposals. If, how-
ever, the foregoing description of the decade's legal developments
should evoke an awareness of any deficiencies in present law, so
much the better.
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. The author acknowledges val-
uable assistance from his research assistant, R. Cletus Maricle, in the preparation
and writing of this article.
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MARRIAGE
New Age Statute-By far the most interesting development in
the field of marriage during the past decade came about by the
enactment of a new statute by the 1964 General Assembly lower-
ing the age at which infants reach majority from twenty-one to
eighteen years "for all purposes in this Commonwealth except for
the purchase of alcoholic beverages and ... treatment of handi-
capped children."' For the latter two purposes the age of
majority remains the same (twenty-one). The broad ramifications
and uncertainties created by this statute are currently being noted
for another issue of the Law Journal, so our only concern here is
the interpretation of this statute vis-a-vis marriage made by the
Court of Appeals in Commonwealth v. Hallahan.2 Before the court
was the question of the effect of the new statute upon the
statutory prohibition of the issuance by the county clerk of a
marriage license without parental consent where one of the parties
seeking to get married is under twenty-one.3 It was held that the
new statute did not repeal the requirement of parental consent
under such circumstances. The new statute was interpreted so that
only statutes which fail to designate age in terms of a precise num-
ber of years will be changed. Presumably the new statute would be
effective to lower the age to eighteen whenever the statute in
question refers to the age of majority or infancy without a
specific age. The court mentioned several instances of ambiguity
in the statute and reached the following conclusion:
It is readily apparent that there is a broad and fertile area
of future litigation arising out of the vague and sweeping
terminology of this statutory effort to simplify something that
is not simple. It moves us to suggest that it would be very
desirable for the legislature to clarify or eliminate KRS 2.015
at the earliest opportunity.4
Validity and Presumptions-During the years 1955 to 1965 no
significant judicial developments have been made in accepted
legal doctrine relating to such matters as validity of the marriage
and the interrelationship of the myriad presumptions and in-
ferences of courts used in this area. As to the validity of marriages,
I Ky. Rev. Stat. 2.015 [hereinafter cited as 7KS.2 Commonwealth N% Hallaban, 891 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. 1965).
3 KRS 402.210.
4 Commonwealth v. Hallahan, 391 S.W.2d 378, 880 (Ky. 1965).
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one case followed the established Kentucky judicial principle that
a marriage was not invalidated merely because the marrying
official had no valid license to perform the ceremony where the
fact was not known to the parties who got married.5 This view of
the Kentucky courts is quite generally held. It is also to be
compared with the similar holding that a solemnized marriage is
valid although the parties to the marriage fail to procure the
statutory license.6
The court has recently commented upon the presumptions of
marriage,7 but this comment was merely a restatement of the
presumptions which had been developed previously. There is a
strong presumption of a marriage from reputation alone,8 and a
marriage may be proved by parole evidence.9
Estoppel-Another interesting trend which is discernible is
estoppel to deny a marriage. In Sears v. Sears,10 where a second
wife had sued for separate maintenance, the court held that the
husband was estopped to deny the validity of their marriage
despite the fact that the second wife knew at the time that the
husband's "mail-order" divorce from the first wife was probably
invalid. A reason for such a trend may be the unfavorable
position that common law marriages now hold.
DIVORCE
Jurisdiction-Jurisdiction of the divorcing court continues to
be a lively subject of litigation. Jurisdiction generally refers to the
power of the court to render its judgment, without which the
judgment is void and subject to collateral attack. In Kentucky
the statute requires that the plaintiff in a divorce action shall have
been a resident within the state for one year next preceding the
commencement of the action..' This requirement goes to the
very existence of the jurisdiction of the court.'2 In Kentucky, and
5 Arthurs v. Johnson, 280 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1955).
6 Haderski v. Haderski, 415 it. 118, 112 N.E.2d 714 (1953).
7 See, Munsey v. Munsey, 303 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1957), sustaining the
validity of an order setting aside a divorce decree, which order had not been
entered on the judgment docket, for purposes of determining the property rights
of a surviving spouse under the marriage.8 Vest's Adm'r v. Vest, 234 Ky. 587, 28 S.W.2d 782 (1930).
9 Carroll v. Carroll, 251 S.W.2d 989 (Ky. 1952).
10 293 F.2d 884 (1961).
" KRS 403.035(1).
12 Lampkin v. Lampkin, 258 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1952); Williams v. North
Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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generally, the statutory residence requirement is considered to
mean domocile. There must be not only the actual fixing of one's
abode but also the present intention of making the state one's
home either permanently or for an indefinite length of time. 3
Several states, including Kentucky by act of the 1952 General
Assembly,' 4 now provide that residence at a United States military
reservation within the state for the required statutory time prior
to the bringing of an action for divorce shall satisfy the residence
requirement and that the action may be brought in any county
adjacent to the military reservation. 15 Since the serviceman plain-
tiff might be permanently domiciled in another state the statutory
provision is tantamount to a lowering of the traditional require-
ment of domicile for jurisdiction to one of mere residence.
Usually the means of challenging a court's jurisdiction is by
an original writ of prohibition sought from the Court of Appeals
prohibiting the lower court from acting if lack of jurisdiction is
determined. It is clear that this extraordinary remedy will be
withheld unless the trial court is plainly without jurisdiction.'"
Thus, the Court of Appeals denied prohibition where the
objection was to the lower court's venue between counties, as
distinguished from the state's territorial jurisdiction based upon
residence.17
Collateral Attack upon Jurisdiction-Lack of jurisdiction by
the divorcing court may also be brought up in a later lawsuit
attacking validity of the divorce collaterally and indirectly. For
example, the original divorce decree may be challenged incidental
to determination of property rights which turn upon whether or
not the marriage still exists or was effectively dissolved. The
voidness of a purported divorce decree for want of jurisdiction
may be thus determined for the first time in a collateral pro-
'3St. John v. St. John, 291 Ky. 363, 163 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1942).14 Ky. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1.
15 KRS 403.035(1).16 Such writs of prohibition were considered in several situations recently by
the Court of Appeals: Moreland v. Helm, 350 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. 1961) (remedy
of prohibition not proper when validity of marriage is questioned); Roberts v.
Osborne, 339 S.W.2d 442 (Ky. 1960) (remedy of prohibition proper to stay con-
tempt and divorce proceedings after lower court signed order dismissing the suit);
Rowley v. Lampe, 331 S.W.2d 887 (Ky. 1960) (remedy of prohibition denied
when grounds alleged took place outside the state before residency was begun in
Kentucky but after the residency requirement of time was begun in Kentucky but
after the residency requirement of time was fulfilled).
17 Burke v. Tartar, 350 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1962). But see, Gross v. Ward, 386
S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1965).
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ceeding, in addition to the direct attack by appeal or occasionally
by a petition to the lower court itself to vacate the judgment
when lack of jurisdiction is discovered.
Although no recent cases (since publication of the 1955
article) have arisen in Kentucky, a case of widespread interest
arose in Alabama. 8 The court which had granted the divorce six
years before vacated its judgment upon discovery, from the
parties' own testimony (they being again before the court upon
a question of property and alimony under the decree), that the
divorce had been granted upon a fraudulent representation to the
court that plaintiff had resided for one year within the state, a
jurisdictional requirement. The case adds uncertainty to the
validity of the Alabama "quickie," both there and elsewhere. To
be compared with the Alabama case is a previous Kentucky case
which recognized the power of a lower court to vacate its own
divorce decree but pointed out that this power should be limited
to clear lack of jurisdiction.'
Lack of jurisdiction of the divorcing court can be raised not
only where the divorce was granted but also in another state in
which recognition of the divorce decree is sought.
An interesting Kentucky case20 recently held that a Georgia
divorce decree is not entitled to full faith and credit where the
defendant was fraudulently decoyed into the state of Georgia for
the purpose of service of process. The collateral attack in Ken-
tucky must be treated as if it had been made in the original
jurisdiction. Although there was no Georgia case in point, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals thought that it was reasonable to
assume that a Georgia court of equity would not allow a fraud to
be perpetrated upon it by means of fraudulent enticement into
the state in order that service might be had.
Most lawyers are familiar with the basic pattern which the
Supreme Court has fixed in interpreting the full faith and credit
18Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725 (1961), 47 Cornell
L.Q. 459-69 (1962), 46 Minn. L. Rev. 982-90 (1962).
19 Kenmont Coal Co. v. Fisher, 259 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953)-"without clear
and convincing proof of utter lack of jurisdiction." This is true except in cases of
statutory annuhnent of divorce decrees upon application of both parties. Whether
or not collusion by both parties to the action undiscovered by the court at the
time constitutes utter lack of jurisdiction has not been answered by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals.20 Hanshew v. Mullins, 385 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1964).
[Vol. K4
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clause as applied to extra-state divorce decrees. Since the Williams
cases21 it is settled that if the complainant was domiciled within
the granting state, the divorce is valid and sister states must give
full faith and credit to the divorce decree even though the judg-
ment was taken by default against the non-domiciliary spouse
constructively served, subject to the right to later challenge the
bona fide domicile within the granting state of the procuring
spouse. However, if both parties appear in the granting court and
there is an affirmative finding that jurisdictional domicile existed,
such a finding is res judicata. Consequently, the judgment is not
subject thereafter to collateral attack and must be accorded full
faith and credit everywhere. 22
Venue-Not to be confused with jurisdiction is the matter of
venue for divorce actions. The Kentucky statute requires that the
action for divorce or alimony be brought in the county where the
wife usually resides or the county of the husband's residence if the
w ife has no actual residence in the state.23 Choice of the wrong
county under this statute is properly a matter of incorrect venue
rther than lack of jurisdiction, provided plaintiff resided in the
state for one year to satisfy the jurisdiction requirement, although
occasionally a court may loosely refer to the question as one of
jurisdiction. 24
There are important differences between questions under the
venue statute and the one year residence requirement. When it
is merely a matter of the correct county in which to sue, a writ of
prohibition may be more sparingly exercised.25 Furthermore,
wrong venue between counties under the statute may be waived
by allowing the case to proceed to trial; whereas, failure of the
Kentucky court to acquire jurisdiction because of insufficient
2 l Williams v. North Carolina H, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v. North
Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).22 Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
23KRS 452.470.24 Whitaker v. Bradley, 349 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1961).2 5 Burke v. Tartar, 350 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1962). For a case allowing a writ
of prohibition see, Gross v. Ward, 386 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1965). There the hus-
band attended the University of Kentucky, and the wife had been residing in
Fayette County for three years. They had spent one summer in Perry County.
After the wife had gone to Missouri, the husband instituted a divorce action in
Perry County. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky issued a writ of prohibition
against the circuit judge of Perry County on the theory there was no proof that
when the wife left for Missouri she intended to change her residence.
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residence in the state for one year could not thus be waived .2
An interesting question which is yet to be answered is whether
the residence required for proper venue is satisfied when a spouse
moves from one county to another within the state.27
Grounds-No important changes in the statutory grounds for
an absolute divorce in Kentucky have come from the proposal by
the Legislature in 1954 for a thorough study of the divorce laws.
Fault-By the 1956 amendment the words "if she is not in like
fault" were deleted as a prerequisite to the wife's cause for divorce
for the husband's cruelty to her,28 a change which had already
been made in favor of the husband's cause for divorce against the
wife on similar grounds in 1950.29 The Court of Appeals recently
commented upon the elimination of the "without like fault"
language in favor of the wife. The court stated that her fault did
not bar her cause where the evidence was sufficient to prove his
cruelty to her.30 Similarly, the courts continue to note the
statutory elimination of fault as a bar to the husband's cause based
upon his wife's cruelty.3'
Cruelty-In Kentucky, cruelty continues to be the most popular
ground, taking the statutory form of "habitually behaving toward
her (or him), for not less than six months in such a cruel and in-
human manner as to indicate a settled aversion to her (him) or
to destroy permanently her (his) peace or happiness."32 This is
26Jones v. Jones, 850 S.W.2d 124 (Ky. 1959).
2 7 1n Burke v. Tartar, 850 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1962), the wife left Somerset
in Pulaski County prior to 9:00 a.m. with her children and belongings, drove
directly to Fayette County, about seventy miles from Somerset, and rented an
apartment in Lexington. There later that day she fied suit for divorce. However
at 9:80 a.m. the same day the husband fed suit for divorce in Pulaski County.
The court denied her an order of prohibition, as she had made no showing she
was a resident of Fayette County at 9:30 a.m. that day. The court refused to
follow the rule that the law takes no account of fractions of a day because, as all
fictions, it is used only when it will promote right and justice. In Sebastian v.
Turner, 320 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1959), the wife left Fayette County and went to
Wolfe County with the intention of remaining and living there indefinitely. She
left her children and a substantial amount of her belongings in Fayette County.
She fed suit for divorce in Wolfe County but left shortly thereafter. The court
entered a permanent order of prohibition precluding her from bringing the action
in Wolfe County holding that she had not completely abandoned her home in
Fayette County and had not established a new residence in good faith in Wolfe
County.2 8 Ky. Acts 1956, ch. 72, at 113. KRS 403.020(3)(b)-(c).
29Ky. Acts 1950, ch. 162, at 640. KRS 403.020(4)(d)-(e).30 Pedigo v. Pedigo, 324 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1959); Minnis v. Minnis, 312
S.W.2d 903 (Ky. 1958).31 Lewis v. Lewis, 354 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1962).
32 KRS 403.020(3) (b), (4) (d).
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understandable since the cruelty allegation ordinarily involves
less moral turpitude and is more readily susceptible of proof than
most other grounds. This is also true in other states permitting
divorce for cruelty in the broad sense, whether the statutory form
is cast in terms of "extreme cruelty", "cruel and inhuman treat-
ment" or the milder "indignities" of "incompatibility."33 The
recent improvement in machinery for gathering of statistical in-
formation on marriage and divorce provided by the 1958 legis-
lation should make possible a more accurate tabulation of the
number of divorces granted and denied as well as the grounds
asserted,34 but it is safe to say that cruelty is a ground for a
majority of Kentucky divorces, and that the divorce is granted
far more often than denied. Hence, there continue to be quite a
few cases35 holding that the divorce was correctly granted by the
lower court for the purpose of determining which party is the
more deserving with regard to the alimony and property determi-
nation. Of course, the appellate court is denied the power to do
other than affirm the granting of a divorce by the lower court.36
Further, when the record warrants the Court of Appeals will
reverse the lower court's denial of a divorce and direct that it be
granted on the evidence.37 Denial of a divorce by the lower court
for want of evidence has been sustained in several cases.38 One
case upheld the discretion of the trial judge in refusing to grant
a divorce in the face of an argument by the appellant husband
that a letter written by the wife to the judge saying that she did
not want a divorce created a prejudice with the judge. The
appeals court noted that the judge had rebuked the wife for
writing the letter and stated that he was denying the divorce in
spite of the letter and not because of it. Furthermore, the judge
was apprised by the wife's deposition that she did not want a
divorce.3
33 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, § 10; Ann. Mo. Stat. 452.010.
'
4 Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 34, at 110. KRS 213.320.35 Conlan v. Conlan, 293 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1956); Hundley v. Hundley, 291
S.W.2d 544 (Ky. 1956); Shephard v. Shephard, 295 S.W.2d 557 (1956).
36 KRS 21.060.37 West v. Vest, 309 S.W.2d 341 (Ky. 1958); Minnis v. Minnis, 312 S.W.2d
903 (Ky. 1958).38 Gartin v. Gartin, 384 S.W.2d 298 (Ky. 1964); Kraanpe, v. Krampe, 339
S.W.2d 446 (Ky. 1960); Walker v. Walker, 324 S.W.2d 804 (Ky. 1959); Dixon
v. Dixon, 306 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1957); Witt v. Witt, 307 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1957).39 Garin v. Gartin, supra note 88.
19661
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The varied forms which cruelty may take is illustrated by the
recent case of Krampe v. Krampe,40 where the wife charged that
the husband behaved "in such a cruel and inhuman manner as to
indicate a settled aversion to her" by wanting to engage in sexual
intercourse to the extent of harming her health on account of
her allergy. In affirming denial of her petition the Court of
Appeals stated: "We have concluded that, if her peace and hap-
piness have been destroyed, it has resulted from her state of mind.
We are unable to say from the record that her husband's conduct
contributed to that state of mind."41
This case is in line with previous decisions from Kentucky
and other jurisdictions holding that unreasonable insistence on
intercourse may constitute cruelty. 42
A spouse's association with members of the opposite sex falling
short of adultery may sometimes nevertheless constitute cruelty.
The Court of Appeals reaffirmed this principle where such
association took the form of courtship with a "slobbering love
letter" in evidence.43
Adultery-For the statutory ground of adultery we find again
that the statutory language is unchanged. The old discrimination
in favor of the husband still remains. While a divorce may be
granted to the husband for the wife's adultery or such lewd and
lascivious conduct "as proves her to be unchaste, without actual
proof of an act of adultery,"44 the wife's only cause for similar
grounds must be found in the provision allowing a divorce to
the party not in fault for his living in adultery.45 This time
honored differentiation seems to have no justification in current
opinion. As previously noted, however, discrimination as to
grounds against the wife has been in part softened by judicial
interpretation.46 For example, there are holdings to the effect that
the lewd and lascivious conduct the statute refers to must be of
such character as to prove her unchaste and not merely to create
40 Ibid.
41Id. at 447.
42 Obennoskey v. Obennoskey, 215 Ark. 358, 220 S.W.2d 610 (1949); Hock-
man v. Hockman, 184 Md. 473, 41 A.2d 510 (1945); On what constitutes un-
reasonableness, see Mudd v. Mudd, 206 La. 1055, 20 So. 2d 311 (1944).
43 Taylor v. Taylor, 331 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1960).
44KRS 403.020(4) (c).
45KRS 403.020(2) (b).
46See Witeside, Domestic Relations-Recent Kentucky Developments 1950-
1955, 44 Ky. L.J. 60, 66 (1955).
[Vol. 54,
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a suspicion.47 Changing attitudes toward social behavior have also
been pointed to by courts to show that the wife's mere opportunity
to commit adultery from her dating a man were insufficient.48 To
fall within the statutory act the husband need not live with
another woman as long as might seem to be necessary from a
casual reading of the statutes. 49 Further, even if the husband's
conduct is insufficient to constitute adultery it may nevertheless
amount to cruelty under certain circumstances. 50
No trends are discernible in the few recent cases which reached
the highest state court. As one would expect, the Court of Appeals
refrains from repeating unnecessarily an elaborate review of the
evidence in these cases. One case held that the chancellor cor-
rently granted the husband a divorce with custody of the three
children based upon the wife's lewd and lascivious conduct where
the statutory requirement of proof by credible witnesses had been
met.51
Although Kentucky's statute expressly states that the offense
of adultery is condoned by subsequent marital relations,5 2 this
condonation, as is the case with other offenses, should be condi-
tional upon the offending spouse thereafter treating the condoning
spouse with conjugal kindness and refraining from repetition of
the offense.53
Abandonment-Several cases involved divorces on the statutory
ground of abandonment for one year's duration. Two cases of
the wife's abandonment of her husband involve also the choice of
domicile by the traditional breadwinner sex. In Dixon v. Dixon5 4
the Court of Appeals, while admitting that the lower court was
not clearly erroneous in denying relief to either spouse upon
weak evidence of cruelty, reversed the denial and held that the
husband should have been granted a divorce upon the basis of the
wife's abandonment. The evidence showed that the wife was very
hard to please as to her abode and finally left a new house that
husband had bought especially for her and stayed away the full
47Blackburn v. Blackburn, 294 Ky. 312, 171 S.W.2d 457 (1943).48 Fister v. Fister, 131 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 1961). Cf. Brumley v. Brumley,
247 S..2d 987 (Ky. 1952).49 Combs v. Combs, 294 Ky. 414, 171 S.W.2d 1001 (1943).
50 Bobbitt v. Bobbitt, 297 Ky. 288, 178 S.W.2d 977 (1944).
51 McQueen v. McQueen, 294 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. 1956).
52KRS 403.030.
53 Tootle v. Tootle, 329 S.W.2d 218 (Mo. 1959).
54 306 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1957).
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one year period. And in another case the court directed that a
bed and board divorce be set aside and an absolute divorce be
granted to the husband because of the wife's refusal and failure
to live at the domicile chosen by the husband for more than
one year.55 The technical requirement that the abandonment be
without consent of the abandoned spouse was held to have been
satisfied despite the fact that the husband had sent his wife
money during the period of her separation from him. Under the
circumstances his sending money was merely recognition of his
obligation to support her and not consent such as to bar him
from setting up her abandonment. Another interesting case is a
ruling by an Arkansas court in regard to the effect which the
Arkansas court gave to a determination by the sister state of Mis-
sissippi. The Arkansas court held that a previous award of
separate maintenance money to a wife by the Mississippi court,
which was not appealed, was res judicata and that there had been
no abandonment by the wife because Mississippi did not give
maintenance to a deserting wife. Therefore, the absence of aban-
donment was necessarily determined by the Mississippi court.50
Insanity-Another ground for divorce in Kentucky, added to
the statutes in 1946, is based upon insanity.57 The court had
occasion to interpret the requirement of confinement in an
asylum for mental illness for "not less than five consecutive"
years prior to filing the petition (for other than insanity shown
by medical testimony to be incurable). Interruption of the con-
finement for a period of a year outside the mental institution
broke the continuity and prevented a divorce on that ground.58
Prior to the enactment of the statute making incurable insanity
or confinement for five years in a mental institution a separate
ground for divorce, the Kentucky courts held that the five year
period required to allow a divorce for living apart could not in-
clude any such time spent in an institution. 59 While this is still
true under the five year separation, the new statute making
commitment to an institution a separate ground is an improve-
ment over previous law because it provides the same relief
55 Dunning v. Dunning, 325 S.W.2d 315 (Ky. 1959).56 Lambert v. Lambert, 316 S.W.2d 822 (Ark. 1958).
57KRS 403.020(5).58 Witherspoon v. Witherspoon, 289 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1955).59 Begley v. Jones, 246 Ky. 135, 54 S.W.2d 639 (1933); Messick v. Messick,
177 Ky. 337, 197 S.W. 792 (1917); Pile v. Pile, 94 Ky. 308, 22 S.W. 215 (1893).
[Vol. 54,
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whether the living apart is because of committal or simply be-
cause the spouses have remained apart by voluntary action. The
statutes taken together, however, still leave much to be desired
since temporary insanity before running of the five year separation
period would break the continuity required by the statutory
ground of living apart for five consecutive years unless the in-
sanity is incurable.
Drunkenness-With respect to habitual drunkenness as a
ground for divorce, it should be noted that the legislature has
chosen to continue the requirement that the petitioning spouse
be without like fault whether the petition is brought by the
husband or the wife,60 thus continuing Kentucky law comparable
at least in result with the decisional law in some jurisdictions that
leading the offending spouse to drink sometimes constitutes con-
nivance.6' Here, however, the impartiality between spouses stops
when it comes to drunkenness. For when the husband is the
offender there must be not only habitual drunkenness for the
required one year's duration (sufficient as a ground against the
wife), but there must also be such continuance "accompanied by a
wasting of the husband's estate and without any suitable provision
for the maintenance of the wife or children." 62 [Emphasis Added]
Out-of-State Grounds-In addition to the foregoing problems
which have arisen under the major grounds for divorce--cruelty,
adultery, desertion under the one year's abandonment provision,
and separation for five consecutive years-a few interesting de-
velopments have occurred under the more uncommon grounds
provided for in Kentucky's statute.
One such uncommon ground, it may be recalled, is found in
the provision specifying the locale for the acts constituting the
cause for divorce. It provides that acts occurring out of state, if
made a ground for divorce by the laws of the other state as well as
under the Kentucky divorce statute,63 constitute valid grounds
though the action took place in the other state and might have
been insufficient as grounds if committed locally. To illustrate,
the Kentucky court with jurisdiction over divorce may be called
CO KS 403.020(3) (a), (4) (b).
61 Muir v. Muir, 86 A.2d 857 (Del. 1952); Rosengren v. Rosengren, 115
N.J. Eq. 283, 170 AU. 660 (1934).62K S 403.020(3)(a).
63KRS 403.035(2).
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upon to adjudicate the sufficiency of other grounds for divorce
such as "indignities" or "incompatibility" when those grounds
are recognized in the state where the parties are when the acts or
events take place. In a fascinating case the Court of Appeals was
recently called upon to interpret ambiguous language in this
provision. The court made clear that the legislature did not in-
tend by its language to require that plaintiff have been a Kentucky
resident at the time of the conduct alleged to constitute grounds,
for such an interpretation would have made the statute meaning-
less as to the conduct occurring in the other state. The only
residence required by Kentucky of the plaintiff is the jurisdi-
ctional requirement of his residence for one year preceding the
bringing of the action. Hence the court had jurisdiction, the
plaintiff-wife having resided within Kentucky for one year prior
to the action. The Court of appeals refused its writ of prohi-
bition based upon asserted lack of jurisdiction based merely upon
plaintiff's nonresidence at the time the out-of-state acts of de-
fendant were committed.64
Defenses-Whatever the virility of current moves for thorough
reform of divorce legislation, the legislature has continued the
requirement of definite grounds, and the courts have at least for-
mally carried out the legislative will by insisting upon proof by
complainant of the existence of one of the prescribed grounds.
Nor has the court changed its approach as to the defensive mat-
ter which the defendant in a divorce action can plead in answer
to the cause for divorce.
Condonation-On condonation of cruelty the court continues
its view that only in the rarest of circumstances does a spouse
condone the continuing offense of cruelty by subsequent marital
relations. 65 To hold otherwise would discourage efforts at re-
conciliation. For desertion under the one year abandonment
statute the husband's recognition of his support obligation by
sending the wife money during the period of separation is not a
condonation of her abandonment. 66
Connivance and Collusion-There have been no recent cases
64Rowley v. Lampe, 831 S.W.2d 887 (Ky. 1960).65 Cox v. Cox, 343 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1961). Cf York v. York, 280 S.W.2d
553 (Ky. 1955), 44 Ky. L.J. 241 (1956); Stephens v. Stephens, 280 S.W.2d 557(Ky. 1955).66 Dunning v. Dunning, 325 S.W.2d 315 (Ky. 1959).
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involving an assertion that plaintiff's connivance designed to faci-
litate defendant's commission of the offense should bar plaintiff's
action. Neither have there been any recent cases involving col-
lusion.
Recrimination-Despite much recent opinion that recrimina-
tion as a defense is or should be on the way out,67 the court
repeatedly recognizes the possibility that recriminatory conduct by
the plaintiff committed by him at any time68 during the entire
course of the marriage and sufficiently serious in nature to have
entitled the other spouse to an absolute divorce 9 may bar his
cause for divorce.70
Of course, where mutual incompatibility is made a ground for
divorce by statute, the legislature has effectively eliminated re-
crimination as a defense. The question has arisen whether Ken-
tucky's legislative elimination of "without like fault" on the part
of either a husband or a wife seeking the divorce as a bar to the
action could be cited as indicative of a dilution of the force of the
doctrine, but the Court of Appeals has made it clear that the
change in the statutory language indicates no such thing 71 The
elimination of the "without fault" language merely recognizes the
fact that both parties are likely to be somewhat at fault and that
it is rare that one is completely without fault. The complaining
spouse, however, must not himself have been guilty of such fault
or such cruelty as to entitle the other spouse to a divorce against
him, or else recrimination will bar him from a divorce. It is only
when the complainant's fault is less serious in nature, for example,
serious enough for the court to have awarded the other party a
bed and board divorce, that his fault is no bar.
Nor does the fact that a divorce was granted to both the plain-
tiff on his petition and the defendant on his cross-claim militate
against the doctrine of recrimination. The Court of Appeals has
67See Note, 41 Ky. L.J. 330 (1954), pointing out that despite occasional
dictum in cases to the contrary the defense of recrimination is extinct in Kentucky.
' Despite the fact that ordinarily action constituting a cause for divorce must
have happened within five years preceding the bringing of the action. KRS 403.035.O' Cox v. Cox, 343 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1961). Conduct merely justifying a bed
and board separation is not sufficient to constitute recriminatory conduct to bar a
divorce. Hass v. Haskins, 188 Va. 525, 50 S.E.2d 437 (1948).
70 Cox v. Cox, supra note 69; Minnis v. Minnis, 312 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. 1958);
Witt v. Witt, 307 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1957).
71 Lewis v. Lewis, 354 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1962); Cox v. Cox, upra note 69;
Pedigo v. Pedigo, 324 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1959); Minnis v. Minnis, supra note 70;
But cf. Carlton v. Carlton, 265 S.W.2d 477 (Ky. 1954).
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commented on the anomaly, under orthodox doctrine, of these
so-called "double divorces". It must be remembered that the
court is nevertheless bound by the statute preventing reversal of
a decree granting a divorce.72 Hence neither of the divorces to
the two spouses would be reversible.
It is true, however, that under Kentucky's statute permitting a
divorce to be granted either party when they have lived apart for
five consecutive years that the defense of recrimination has no
place. 73 When the condition of this statute is satisfied no inquiry
is made into what caused the parties to have lived apart without
any cohabitation.
Bed and Board Divorces-The above grounds and defenses are
of course irrelevant in case a limited divorce only is sought. Such
limited divorces can be granted under the Kentucky "bed and
board" statute74 any time the court of equity thinks fit, as well as
when grounds for absolute divorce are deemed insufficient.
The inadequacy of the bed and board divorce as a catch-all
solution where the court is at a loss for what to do has already
been well noted in the Law Journal.75 A few of the more recent
cases indicate an awareness by the Court of Appeals of the possible
over-use of the bed and board divorce.76 However, a substantial
number of cases granting bed and board divorces show its proper
function.77 In one of these 78 the court cited approvingly a pre-
vious case79 on the shortcomings of a bed and board divorce, but
72 Hundley v. Hundle 291 S.W.2d 544 (Ky. 1956).
3KRS 402.020 (1) (b).
74KRS 403.050.
75A previous writer emphasizes the following objections: the bed and board
divorce easily leads to temptations of adultery but is no defense to adultery be-
tween the parties or with any other person; if children are born they may be con-
sidered illegitimate; neither party may remarry; and in cases where there appears
no chance of a reconciliation, the parties are prevented from seeking happiness
with another. See Note, 43 Ky. L.J. 322 (1954).
76 Judgment for bed and board divorce reversed in favor of absolute divorce.
Dunning v. Dunning, 325 S.W.2d 315 (Ky. 1959); Coleman v. Coleman, 269
S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1954); Eckhoff v. Eckhoff, 247 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1951). See
Witt v. Witt, 307 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1957).
77 Brown v. Brown, 847 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1961) (affirmed action of lower
court granting only a bed and board divorce where party seeking absolute divorce
not entitled to it); Hadd v. Hadd, 325 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1959) (lower court
should have granted wife's prayer for bed and board divorce where her proof sus-
tained right to absolute had she asked for it); Alford v. Alford, 317 S.W.2d 887(Ky. 1958) (bed and board to wife on her counterclaim where proof of husband
was insufficient ground for absolute divorce).
78 Brown v. Brown, supra note 77.
79 Coleman v. Coleman, 269 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1954).
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observed that the bed and board divorce is nevertheless appro-
priate where the party seeking an absolute divorce without
grounds and the more deserving party prays for a bed and board
solution. Granting the limitations of the bed and board divorce,
it may be the best solution available in the following situations:
(1) There is still hope of affecting a reconciliation, (2) Absolute
divorce from bonds of matrimony with freedom of spouses to re-
marry is contrary to the religions of the parties, or (3) Neither
spouse seeks remarriage, or (4) A spouse who is dissatisfied with
property settlement proposed by the other refuses absolute divorce
in favor of bed and board divorce in order to force more favorable
terms. One case had occasion to describe carefully the effects
upon properties held by the parties to a bed and board divorce.8s
While the bed and board divorce does not ordinarily affect the
rights of parties to property owned at the time of the decree, it
does operate to permit the parties to acquire separate property
prospectively. Maintenance should be awarded to take the place
of the husband's personal responsibility for the wife's bills. Of
course, the parties remain married, although living apart by
judicial order, and either would inherit a spouse's share upon
death of the other in the absence of a separation agreement to the
contrary.
ALhEONY
An increasing amount of divorce litigation demonstrates that
adjustment of the property rights of the parties to a broken mar-
riage will continue to be of greatest concern to the lawyer. There
is usually little question as to the divorce itself in the cases brought
to the highest court on the amount and kind of alimony to be
awarded. Most of the recent cases involve the application of
familiar principles to infinitely diverse factual situations. Some
interesting trends are nevertheless discernible.
The lower court's discretion in denyings the wife's alimony or
in detremining the appropriate amount of alimony in most cases
is affirmed in routine fashion.82 Quite frequently, however, a re-
8) Gentry v. Gentry, 818 S.W.2d 870 (Ky. 1958).
81 Anderson v. Anderson, 392 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1965); Sears v. Sears, 339
S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1960).
s2 Ingram v. Ingram, 385 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. 1964); Jones v. Jones, 382 S.W.2d
842 (Ky. 1964); Crowe v. Crowe, 352 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1961); Gann v. Gann, 347
S.W.2 540 (Ky. 1961); Peavy v. Peavy, 351 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. 1961); Boyd v.
(Continued on next page)
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view of the evidence dictates reversal because of inadequacy of
the provisions made for the wife. 3 A great number of the ap-
pealed cases seem to review the correctness of divorces granted
below,84 but in reality are appealed for the purposes of deciding
the fairness of the alimony award and property rights of the
parties.8 5 These cases at first blush might indicate that fault of
the parties in causing the breaking up of the marriage is a major
factor in determination of alimony, but a closer examination
shows that such fault of itself is not determinative.
Fault-Although the Kentucky statutory language is phrased
to entitle a needy wife to alimony when "on a divorce obtained
by her,' '8 6 it is well established by judicial interpretation that a
needy wife may receive alimony on a divorce granted to the
husband where she is not entirely to blame for breaking up the
marriage and is free from moral delinquency.sr But if the court
finds the wife entirely at fault it has stated that she is not entitled
to any alimony.s Sometimes, however, the wife's lack of fault is
(Footnotes continued from preceding page)
Boyd, 335 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. 1960); Davis v. Davis, 347 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1960);
Jackson v. Jackson, 320 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1959); Patterson v. Patterson 232 S.W.2d
862 (Ky. 1959); Combs v. Combs, 314 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 1958); Centers v. Cen-
ters, 294 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1956); Wells v. Wells, 293 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1956);
Willoughby v. Willoughby, 294 S.W.2d 550 (Ky. 1956).
83 Combs v. Combs, 350 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1961) (Court held inadequate a
200 dollar lump sum settlement to wife against whom the divorce was granted);
Heustis v. Heustis, 346 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1961) (Court reversed a 125 dollar a
month alimony as inadequate and directed lump sum alimony out of the consider-
able estate); Turner v. Turner, 336 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1960) (Although the hus-
band got the divorce and custody of the children from drinking wife, the court
held the situation called for at least 350 dollars a month alimony); Alexander v.
Alexander, 317 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1958) (1,000 dollars lump sum alimony out of
estate of 17,000 dollars inadequate); Witt v. Witt, 307 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1957)
(Reversed 2,000 dollars lump sum, increased monthly payments from 35 dollars
to 50 dollars); Snider v. Snider, 302 S.W.2d 621 (Ky. 1957) (Although husband
was given divorce and custody of the child, the mentally ill wife should receive
1,000 dollars lump sum alimony out of an estate worth around 11,000 dollars).
84 KRS 21.060(1) (b) provides that a final order granting a divorce may not
be appealed. Appeal from an order denying a divorce is not affected by this
statute.85 Witt v. Witt, 307 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1957); Lampkin v. Lampkin, 258 S.W.2d
720 (Ky. 1952).
86 KRS 403.060(1).
87 The earlier Kentucky cases are collected in 34 ALR2d 313, 344-45 (1954).
More recent cases are: Baker v. Baker, 344 S.W.2d 391 (Ky. 1961); Combs v.
Combs, 350 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1961); Pearson v. Pearson, 350 S.W.2d 141 (Ky.
1961); Terrell v. Terrell, 352 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1961); Turner v. Turner, 336
S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1960); Boggs v. Boggs, 330 S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 1959); Scalf v.
Scalf, 312 S.W.2d 467 (Ky. 1958); Snider v. Snider, 302 S.W.2d 621 (Ky. 1957);
Bailey v. Bailey, 294 S.W.2d 942 (Ky. 1956); Howard v. Howard, 291 S.W.2d
828 (Ky. 1956).
88 Rutledge v. Rutledge, 310 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1958). And see Rogers v.
Rogers, 295 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1956).
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mentioned in her favor s9 and one opinion states that it is error to
refuse alimony to a wife granted a divorce without finding of
fault on her part.00 Where it is the husband's serious fault which
leads to divorce, the court takes note of the fact that fault is not
ordinarily an element in alimony awards. 1 The amount and
character of the award, rather, is based upon the husband's finan-
cial means and the wife's needs, there being a definite trend in
the most recent cases to emphasize these two variables as the pri-
mary factors.9 2
Lump Sum-An alimony award may take the form of an out-
right settlemnet (including a lump sum payable in installments),93
periodic installments, or both.94 The recent cases supporting an
award of a lump sum are very numerous. 95 They show a recogni-
tion of the policy to favor lump sum over periodic payments
where this is possible.96 Sometimes, of course, there is no accumu-
lated estate, and the existence of earning capacity renders periodic
payments the only possible type provision.97  Furthermore, if
capital assets are going to have to be liquidated in order to pay
alimony, the income tax consequences are to be considered in
determining the time of payment.93
Though merely a rough rule-of-thumb, variable according to
the circumstances, the Court of Appeals has continually stated
89 Boggs v. Boggs, 330 S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 1959).O Henderson v. Henderson, 336 S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1960).
01 Francisco v. Francisco, 831 SAV.2d 279 (Ky. 1960).
92 Combs v. Combs, 350 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1961); Francisco v. Francisco, 331
S.W.2d 279 (Ky. 1960). See also, Carter v. Carter, 382 S.W.2d 400 (Ky. 1964)
(Where there is no estate accumulated by the husband during the marriage, the
wife is not entitled to alimony as a matter of right).
031Rogers v. Rogers, 295 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1956).
04 Davis v. Davis, 347 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1961) (both lump sum and periodic
alimony); Holcomb v. Holcomb, 337 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. 1960) (periodic alimony);
Snider v. Snider, 302 S.W.2d 621 (Ky. 1957) (lump sum alimony).
95 Lindsey v. Lindsey, 358 S.W.2d 484 (Ky. 1962); Davis v. Davis, 347
S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1961); Day v. Day, 347 S.W.2d 549 (Ky. 1961); Heustis v.
Heustis, 346 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1961); Pearson v. Pearson, 350 S.W.2d 141 (Ky.
1961); Patterson v. Patterson, 323 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1959); Yonts v. Yonts, 329
S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1959).96 Heustis v. Heustis, 346 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1961) (reversed as inadequate an
award of 125 dollars periodic alimony and ordered lump sum alimony at not
less than one-third total net estate); Yonts v. Yonts, 329 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1959).
This policy favoring the lump sum award is supported in an article relating to the
psychology of alimony. See Peele, Social and Psychological Effect of Alimony,
6 L. & C.P. 283 (1939).
07Holcomb v. Holcomb, 337 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. 1960); Witt v. Witt, 307
S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1957).98 Broida v. Broida, 388 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Ky. 1965), where the court said,
"there is no need for, and every reason to avoid, making the taxing authorities
beneficiaries of the litigation."
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that one-third the total amount of all properties accumulated dur-
ing marriage is a ready guide to the fair amount of a lump sum
settlement.9 9 A major limitation upon lump sum, as well as
periodic, alimony awards in Kentucky is that "no such allowance
shall divest the husband of the fee simple title to real estate."
Although this statutory injunction has been respected, there is
nothing to prevent real property from standing as security for
alimony'00 nor to prevent the taking of real property after the
personal property is exhausted in satisfaction of a -writ of execu-
tion to collect a judgement for accrued alimony.101
Speaking of enforcement of alimony decrees, contempt re-
mains the most frequently and easily used method.10 2
Restoration of Property-Closely related to the allowance to
the wife of a lump sum settlement by way of alimony is the other
means by which the wife may receive a distribution of family
assets upon family dissolution. After providing for alimony the
statute provides that "each party shall be restored all the property
... that he or she obtained from or through the other before or
during the marriage and in consideration of the marriage."'10 3 Of
course this provision refers to the return to each spouse of his or
her property owned independently of the marriage; whereas, a
lump sum alimony award is made from property accumulated
during marriage or belonging to the spouse required to pay
alimony. An interesting case in which these two theories were
intermingled was recently noted in the Law Journal.10 4 Even
though the wife has been quilty of too much fault in connection
with the dissolution of the marriage to be entitled to alimony, she
99 Olish v. Ollish, 382 S.W.2d 876 (Ky. 1964) (wife entitled to at least one-
third of estate accumulated from the husband where she was not at fault in dis-
solution of the marriage and performed her wifely duties during a substantial part
of the marriage relation); Combs v. Combs, 850 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1961) (re-
versing for determination of husband's finances and estate in order to determine
fair share to wife against whom divorce ordered); Heustis v. Heustis, 346 S.W.2d
778 (Ky. 1961); Boggs v. Boggs, 330 S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 1959) (one-third total
estate properly exceeded in chancellor's discretion); Alexander v. Alexander, 317
S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1958) (Court points out that the fraction of one-third of the
estate is apparently based upon dower).
100 Gentry v. Gentry, 318 S.W.2d 870 (Ky. 1958); Noll v. Noll, 282 S.W.2d
620 (Ky. 1955). See Murphy, Enforcement of Alimony Decrees in Kentucky, 41
Ky. LJ. 385 (1958).
101 Murphy, supra note 100.
102 Id. at 336.
103 KRS 403.060.
'
0 4IKivett v. Kivett, 812 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. 1958), 47 Ky. L.J. 578 (1959).
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is still entitled to restoration of the property she contributed. 10 5
One surprising aspect of the recent cases interpreting this statute
requiring an equitable restitution to each spouse of his own
property is the number of cases in which the lower court has been
reversed for failure to do so. 106 Restoration of property is based
upon the acutal value of the property at the time of contribution
without interest rather than its enhanced value. 07
In Rogers v. Rogers, 108 the court made its determination, ad-
verse to an unusual contention by the husband, that his support
of wife and child beyond the call of duty (i.e., beyond the mere
"necessaries" measured by their economic station in life) during
the early stages of the marriage did not entitle him to reimburse-
ment upon termination of the marriage either in the form of
reduction of property restored to his wife or reduction of his sup-
port or alimony obligation. Furthermore, a wife is not entitled
to restoration of property for her contribution to family living
expenses. 09
If property rights are not determined by the divorce decree,
an action for restoration may be instituted."0 Since there may
be an independent action subsequent to the divorce and since this
is not a strictly personal right, the personal representative is under
a duty to assert the right for the estate."'
Where a party seeking restoration fails to comply with the
alimony and maintenance order, fails to personally appear in cir-
cuit court when a contempt rule is issued against him, and fails
to take any steps to prevent the court's sale of property or its sub-
sequent confirmation, the trial court is not required to restore the
property." 2
Modification-In line with the statutory"3 and judicial pro-
105 Taylor v. Taylor, 331 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1960) (Wife entitled to restitution
of her own property despite her sole fault leading to divorce).100 Pearson v. Pearson, 350 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1961); Taylor v. Taylor, 331
S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1960); Stubblefield v. Stubblefield, 327 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1959);
Willoughby v. Willoughby, 294 S.W.2d 550 (Ky. 1956).
107Triplett v. Triplett, 328 S.W.2d 545 (Ky. 1959); Kivett v. Kivett, 312
S.W.2d 884 (Ky. 1958).108 295 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1956).
1o9 Legel v. Legel, 382 S.W.2d 870 (Ky. 1964).
110 Fyffe v. Fyke, 375 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1964).
"'1 Henderson v. Baker, 362 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1962).
112 Hughes v. Hughes, 384 S.W.2d 83 (Ky. 1964).
113 403.020(5) (d).
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nouncements114 relating to judicial authority to modify, there is
discernible in the case an increasing tendency to anticipate in
advance some expected future time or change in circumstances
when such modification is to be made or applied for."-
Termination-It is still the general rule that the obligation
terminates upon the husband's death, absent a contrary agreement
incorporated in the decree. In Desjardins v. Desiardins,"6 the
federal court in the eastern district of Kentucky so held. The
obligation ended with the husband's death. Express language in
the decree "so long as the wife shall live or until she remarries""' 7
[emphasis added] was considered by the court not to be inconsis-
tent with the general principle that the obligation ceases when
the husband dies.118
It still seems to be the general rule that the subsequent remar-
riage of the wife terminates the obligation of periodic alimony
payments but not the obligation to pay lump sum alimony
whether in installments or not.119
Alimony After Divorce-The Kentucky statute contemplates
that incidental to divorce actions the court shall straighten out the
interests of the parties in their property and affairs and grant
alimony for the wife. 120 Sometimes, however, the divorce decree
is silent on these matters. It may well be that expectation of an
accord by the parties on these matters is the reason for failing to
prosecute the matter to an adjudication by the court. Such a case
was Reynierson v. Reynierson,'12 1 where the wife was properly
permitted to maintain her separate action in equity for alimony
some months after termination of the divorce action. However,
where there are no unusual circumstances the general rule seems
114 Gaun v. Gaun, 347 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Ky. 1961) (The Court, in stressing
its power to modify alimony allowances, seems to overlook KRS 403.020 (5) (d)).
11Gaun v. Gaun, 347 S.W.2d 540 (Ky. 1961) (material or substantial
change in conditions of the parties such as a change in the financial circumstances
or needs of the parties); Barrickman v. Barrickman, 296 S.W.2d 475 (Ky.
1956) (inadequacy of husbands income or improvement of wifes financial
condition).
116 193 F. Supp. 210 (E.D. Ky. 1961).
"7 Ibid.
118 Contrast the holding in a North Dakota case, Stoutland v. Stoutland,
103 N.W.2d 286 (N.D. 1960), in which the court held similar language in the
decree meant that the obligation continued as an obligation against the husband's
estate after his death until the wife should die or remarry.
119 Piersall v. Piersall, 302 Ky. 486, 194 S.W.2d 627 (1946).
120 KRS 403.060(1).
121 303 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. 1957).
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to be that in the absence of a determination of alimony in the
decree awarding the divorce the question of alimony is res
judicata.-1 2
Alimony Pendente Lite-It is now the established rule in Ken-
tucky that the crediting of temporary alimony payments against
the total award of alimony is discretionary with the chancellor.12 3
Of course, on a question of reasonableness of the total award this
may be considered.124 The theory behind such a rule is that the
alimony pendente lite has already been considered along with all
the other factors by the chancellor in arriving at the amount of
the total award.
Prior to the three 1964 cases there were two lines of authority
on this question. The earlier cases,' 25 which have now been over-
ruled, -'20 held that a credit should be allowed toward the total
award for that paid not only after judgment pending appeal but
also for that paid before judgment was entered. On the other
hand, Hicks v. Hicks'2 7 held that the all6wance or non-allowance
of pendente lite alimony payments as a credit toward the ultimate
award is a matter to be taken into consideration by the chancellor
in fixing the amount of the permanent award. A credit toward
the total award of the amount paid after judgment and pending
appeal apparently still remains in the law.
Property Settlements-When there is a parting of the ways by
a formal divorce or otherwise, property settlement agreements
continue to be looked upon with favor by the courts.128 These
separation agreements must be "fair and reasonable in view of
the circumstances of the parties at the time and with full know-
ledge of the rights and consequences of the agreement.' '1 29 If a
party has been defrauded or overreached in executing the agree-
ment, the court should not incorporate it in the decree. 30 When
V)2 Reynierson v. Reynierson, 303 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. 1957). See also, In re
Potts, 142 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 868 (1945).
123 Broida v. Broida, 288 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1964); Heustis v. Heustis, 381
SAV.2d 533 (Ky. 1964); Hickey v. Hickey, 383 S.W.2d 114 (Ky. 1964).
124 Broida v. Broida, supra note 123; Heustis v. Heustis, Supra note 123.
125Oldham v. Oldham, 259 S.W.2d 42 (Ky. 1953); Wheeler v. Wheeler,
2-38 S.W.2d 1001 (Ky. 1951).120 Hickey v. Hickey, 383 S.W.2d 114 (Ky. 1964).
127 290 S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1956).
128 Childress v. Childress, 335 S.W.2d 351 (Ky. 1960).
129Id., at 353.
130 Ibid. In this case an illiterate husband relinquished his right to con-
siderable property acquired during marriage for a nominal sum. The court set
(Continued on next page)
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a wife is not entitled to alimony, it is not error to incorporate into
the divorce decree a property settlement agreement which makes
no mention of alimony.1' 1 And when a property settlement
agreement is executed by the parties and not incorporated into
the decree which makes no mention of alimony, although the
husband will be required to pay the wife the sum agreed upon,
any claim to alimony will be considered waived. 132
After an agreed judgment has been entered awarding alimony
or child maintenance 33 the parties may subsequently modify the
award by agreement.
The Court of Appeals has made it clear that when a father
wrongfully destroys the source of payments for child support pro-
vided for in an agreement not incorporated in the divorce decree,
the court will require him to continue the agreed payments. The
duty to support is not destroyed if he has the present ability to
pay. 3 4 Nor will the Court of Appeals "rewrite the contract" to
conform with the allegations and proof of the petitioner. 3 5
An intriguing problem is presented concerning the effect on
separation agreements when the parties subsequently become re-
conciled and resume cohabitation. The recent cases point out
that separation agreements will usually be annulled, at least as to
the unexecuted portions, when this occurs.136 However, if the
agreement is fully executed before the reconciliation, the court
must then look to the intention of the parties to determine
whether the agreement was intended to be annulled by the
reconciliation. 37 This intention may be found in the express
(Footnotes continued from preceding page)
aside a default judgment which incorporated the agreement. Cf. Hedgespeth v.
Hedgespeth, 301 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. 1957). The court refused to set aside judge-
ment incorporating a property settlement agreement on ground of misrepresentation
when evidence showed plaintiff was an astute businesswoman.
131 Rutledge v. Rutledge, 310 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1958) (wife almost entirely
at fault).
13 2 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Hobson, 384 S.W.2d (Ky. 1964);
Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. West, 383 S.W.2d 116 (Ky., 1964).
133 Montgomery v. Montgomery, 809 S.W.2d 188 (Ky. 1958) (award of
alimony reduced by agreement allowed); Reid v. Reid, 300 S.W.2d 225 (Ky.
1957) (award of child maintenance reduced by agreement allowed).
134 Henderson v. Henderson, 350 S.W.2d 477 (Ky. 1961) (Father forced the
corporation of which he was a member, and from which the support money was
to come, out of business by opening a competing business).
135 0'Nan v. O'Nan. 345 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1961).
136 Gordon v. Gordon, 335 S.W.2d 561 (Ky. 1960); Hall v. Hall, 328
S.W.2d 541 (Ky. 1959); Goodalser v. Littell, 314 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. 1958).
187 Ibid.
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terms of the original contract or in a subsequent agreement. In
the absence of such an agreement the intention may be shown by
the acts and conduct of the parties and from the circumstances. 13
The Court of Appeals generally affirms the lower court's determi-
nation of this intention. 39
Another interesting recent case involved a separation agree-
ment which provided for child support. The agreement was in-
corporated into a divorce decree and was to be effective subject
to further orders of the court. The Court of Appeals held that
the agreement was terminated by the death of the father. 4° In
reaching this result the court distinguished Arnold v. Arnold's
Ex'r14 1 pointing out that that case is in accord with other juris-
dictions "that a contract of the father assuming support payments
for his child through a given or definite period of time is not
terminated by his death."' 42
These days an awareness of federal tax consequences is most
important for counsel in negotiating separation agreements. 143
Some of the most important recent developments here are the
holdings in United States v. Davis44 and Commissioner v. Lester. 45
The Lester case held that where the provisions of the decree, in-
strument, or agreement do not make definite the amount of
the periodic payments that are for the benefit either of the
wife or of the children, then all such payments are deductible by
the husband and taxable to the wife. The Davis case held that
the transfer of appreciated property by the husband to the wife
in return for her relinguishment of marital rights in a marriage
settlement is a taxable event resulting in a gain to the husband.
A recent Kentucky case held that if capital assets are going to have
to be liquidated in order to pay alimony, the income tax con-
138 Gordon v. Gordon, 335 S.W.2d 561 (Ky. 1960).
139Ibid. (Judgment holding no intent to nullify because husband broke
promise which induced reconciliation affirmed); Hall v. Hall, 328 S.W.2d 541(Ky.1959) (Judgment holding intention was to nullify as property was usedjointly as before separation affirmed); Goodalser v. Littell, 314 S.W2d 539 (Ky.
1958) (Judgment affirmed holding no intent to nullify as land was not deeded
back after reconciliation and written agreement was not destroyed).
140 Bowling v. Robinson, 332 S.W.2d 285 (Ky. 1960).
141 237 S.W2d 58 (Ky. 1951).
142 Bowling v. Robinson, 332 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Ky. 1960).
143 See, 2 Banks-Baldwin, Kentucky Legal Forms 903(1); (2) (1964), for
a very valuable checklist on tax consequences and separation agreements.
144366 U.S. 299 (1961).
145370 U.S. 65 (1962).
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sequences are to be considered in determining the time of
payments. 14 6
CHILD SUPPORT
Although the Kentucky statute147 authorizes the court in-
cidental to a divorce action to provide for the "care, custody and
maintenance" of minor children of the marriage, failure of the
court to do so does not bar a later action by the divorced wife to
secure payments for future support of the child in her custody. 4s
The mother's custody does not affect father's support duty. Of
course any judgment for support of children is, like alimony,
subject to the possibility of subsequent modification by the court
as to future payments. 1 4  This rule is applicable even though the
case may be on appeal, 150 or the parties have contracted other-
wise.' 51 The lower court's exercise of discretion in determining
the amount of monthly payment, whether on petition to modify
or in determining the amount in the first instance, is usually
affirmed.152 One recent case, however, held that the monthly pay-
ments for two children should have been 400 dollars, not just
200 dollars per month while the mother had custody, when the
father was on a 24,000 dollar annual salary. 5 3 One noteworthy
case154 establishes the right of a father ordered to make main-
tenance payments in a definite amount to a hearing on his petition
for a reduction even though his increasing financial disability
causes him to default prior to hearing and reverses the lower
146Broida v. Broida, 888 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1965).
14 KRS 403.070.
148 Waters v. Waters, 251 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1952).
149 "At any time afterward, upon the petition of either parent, the court may
revise any of its orders as to the children, having principally in view in all such
cases the interest and welfare of the children. KRS 403.070. Gamblin v.
Gamblin, 354 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1962); Honaker v. Honaker, 332 S.W.2d 550 (Ky.
1960) (Payments reduced, change in father's health and earnings); Nugent v.
Nugent, 328 S.W.2d 425 (Ky. 1959) (Increase beyond forty dollars a month re-
fused where wife with custody worked and was provided free board on parent's
farm); Spencer v. Spencer, 312 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1958); Benson v. Benson, 291
S.W.2d 27 (Ky. 1956) (Increased monthly amount); Bloodworth v. Bloodworth,
296 S.W.2d 232 (Ky. 1956) (Reduction refused).
15 0 De Simone v. De Simone, 392 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1965).
151Elkins v. Elkins, 359 S.W.2d 620 (Ky. 1962).
152 In all the cases cited in note 149 supra, the lower court's discretion was
upheld.
153 Conlan v. Conlan, 293 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1956) (Also involved an appeal
from a difficult custody problem following a broken marriage, in which the
chancellor's discretion in making a divided custody determination for the time
being was affirmed).
154 Knight v. Knight, 341 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1960), 50 Ky. L.J. 411 (1962).
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court determination to the effect that his default as to past due
payments deprives him of his right to a hearing on his need for
a reduction. Language by the court would support a similar
holding even though the husband were in default prior to his
filing of the petition. There is no question as to the authority of
the court to enforce by the contempt procedure its order for
support.1' Nor is it an excuse for disobedience by the father,
ex-husband, of a court order for support that the mother had re-
moved the child from Kentucky in violation of the court decree
provision for his visitation rights,156 or had violated the terms of
the judgment relating to custody of the children.157 Other ruses
to escape payment have not worked either. Thus a father of five
children ordered to pay 350 dollars per month for their support
and to put up stock in his business to secure such payment did not
escape by establishing a competitive business causing the original
business to collapse. 158 Another case held constiutional a criminal
statute making it a felony for a father to fail to comply with court
orders relative to maintenance of a child under sixteen and with-
out independent means of support.'59
There is a definite trend toward holding that the continued
duty to support children may include responsibility to provide
for higher education. A recent Kentucky case pointed out that
the age for termination of the father's obligation is normally
twenty-one and that education away from home may be involved
before that time.160
In light of this trend it is doubtful if the new statute in Ken-
tucky discussed at the beginning of this article has lowered the
age up until which the father remains responsible for the care,
custody, and education of his minor child.
The amount to be allowed for child support is the minimum
amount necessary for the support of the children. There are
several factors that are not to be given consideration by the
chancellor in setting the amount a divorced husband should con-
15 Mulkey v. Martin, 385 SAV.2d 565 (Ky. 1960).
150 Spencer v. Spencer, 312 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1958).
51s Henderson v. Henderson, 350 S.W.2d 477 (Ky. 1961).
157 Dalton v. Dalton, 367 S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1963).
159 Commonwealth v. Mason, 317 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1958), upholding KRS
435.240(3) (a).
IGO Pass v. Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 118 so.2d 769 (1960), 109 U. Pa. L. Rev.
130 (1960); Clark v. Graves, 282 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1955) (Private preparatory
school. See KRS 405.020(2).
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tribute to the maintenance of the children. One of these is the
financial condition of the divorced wife;161 another is the earnings
of the father. 62 It is submitted, though, that the chancellor can-
not absolutely put these factors out of his mind and more often
than not the amount of child support awarded will be somewhat
altered by the financial circumstances of the ex-wife and the ex-
husband.
If maintenance for the children is allowed pending an action
for divorce under KRS 403.060, the order so allowing is inter-
locutory and is not an appealable order under Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure 54.01 [here in-after cited as CR]. 54.01.163 The
allowance of maintenance pending an action for divorce does not
ultimately adjudicate the rights of the parties.
It is important to note that a husband does not have to pay
maintenance support to his wife for a child that she has by a
former marriage and which the husband has not adopted. 164
There is presently a development on the reverse side of the
coin. The court has now had occasion to construe the statutory
provision requiring an adult child to provide for a needy parent
the "necessary shelter, food, care and clothing."'165 In that
case, 16 6 the court narrowly construed the statutory provision by
refusing to impose financial responsibility upon a daughter for
a hospital bill which the mother was unable to pay. It was pointed
out by the court that this statute was aimed at needs of a personal
nature rather than a professional one and that the inability to
pay hospital bills does not mean that one is destitute and indigent.
CHILD CUSTODY
A tragic incident of many divorce actions is the necessity of
making some compromise or determination with respect to
custody of children of the marriage. 16 The note 168 by Prof.
161 De Simone v. De Simone, 392 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1965).
162Robinson v Robinson, 363 S.W.2d 111 (Ky. 1962). Sufficient relief will
be provided to such a person when mitigating circumstances are addressed to the
court in defense of contempt proceedings.63 Lebus v. Lebus, 382 S.W.2d 873 (Ky. 1964).
164 McDowell v. McDowell, 878 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1964).
165 KRS 405.080.
166 Woods v. Ashland Hospital Corp., 340 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1960).
167 KRS 403.070 provides in part that "pending an application for divorce,
or on final judgement, the court may make orders for the care, custody and
maintenance of the minor children of the parties and any of their children of
unsound mind."
168 41 Ky. L.J. 324 (1953).
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Charles N. Carnes analyzing the factors weighed by the Kentucky
courts from 1940 to 1952 in the determination of child custody is
still the most definitive treatment of the Kentucky cases, and only
those recent cases which add to or explain significantly the factors
as outlined in that article will be discussed. Almost all the cases
continue to announce the generality that the child's welfare is
paramount, but resolution of this issue is not susceptible of any
ready formula. Hence the Court of Appeals most frequently af-
firms the decision of the chancellor "who has lived with the
case,"' 69 but sometimes reverses for reasons stated. 70 Similarly, on
petitions to modify previous custody determinations, the Court
of Appeals has ordinarily affirmed the lower court in its grant-
ing'7' or its denial' 7 2 of an order changing the custody. Should
the lower court, however, direct a change of custody in the absence
of an actual change of conditions, a reversal of such an order is
to be predicted. 173 Then too, the Court of Appeals might reverse
where it considers the lower court's finding to be based upon in-
sufficient taking of proof. 74
It is usually stated that a divorce judgment procured by fraud
and perjury as to residence may by a direct attack be set aside as
169 Hinton v. Hinton, 377 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. 1964); Day v. Day, 347 S.W.2d
549 (Ky. 1961); Futrell v. Futrell, 346 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1961); Harper v. Harper,
344 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1961); Morris v. Morris, 336 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1960);
Somerville v. Somerville, 339 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1960); Wilkerson v. Wilkerson,
335 S.W.2d 552 (Ky. 1960); Williams v. Williams, 338 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 1960);
Hall v. Hall, 329 S.W.2d 375 (Ky. 1959); McCormack v. Lewis, 328 S.W.2d 415
(Ky. 1959); Nugent v. Nugent, 328 S.W.2d 425 (Ky. 1959); Meek v. Meek, 318
S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1958); Riggle v. Rhoten, 319 S.W2d 472 (Ky. 1958); Roberts
v. Roberts, 307 S.W.2d 757 (Ky. 1957); Somerville v. Somerville, 306 S.W.2d
301 (Ky. 1957).
170 Hatfield v. Decossett, 325 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. 1959) (Custody award of
children to father reversed and remanded for failure of lower court to set out
findings of fact according to CR 52.01); Hatfield v. Decossett, 339 S.W.2d 631
(Ky. 1960) (Custody award to father reversed as mother was a fit person to
raise children of tender years); Goff v. Goff, 323 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1959)
(Custody award to mother reversed as mother was an unfit person to have
custody). Cf Pickett v. Farrow, 340 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. 1960) where custody award
to maternal grandmother of child reversed and custody granted to father, the
mother having died.
171 Hall v. Hall, 386 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1964). Vincent v. Vincent, 316
S.W.24d 853 (Ky. 1958); Estes v. Estes, 299 S.W.2d 785 (Ky. 1957). Cf., Mer-
riman v. Selvey, 296 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1956). But see, Goff v. Goff, supra
note 170.
172 Gholson v. Cholson, 383 S.W.2d 909 (Ky. 1964). Wyatt v. Webb, 317
S.W.2d 883 (Ky. 1958). Cf. Shaw v. Graham, 310 S.W.2d 522 (Ky. 1958).
173 Hatfield v. Derossett, 339 S.W.2d 631 (Ky. 1960).
'74 See Cupp v. Cupp, 302 S.W.2d 371 (Ky. 1957) where the mother, who
had been awarded custody by the divorce decree, died, it was error for circuit
court to refuse restoration of custody to the father solely on confidential recom-
mendation of a welfare worker without giving father a chance to present proof.
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void even though the party obtaining the divorce has remarried
and innocent parties may be affected, 75 but the welfare of a child
is controlling over this rule. 7 6
Where a child is determined to be a qualified witness, his
testimony must be given in the presence of the parties or their
counsel if it is to be made a basis of the court's decision. 77
In spite of the common law preference for the father,17 8 the
child's welfare frequently requires that a very young child be
placed in the care of its mother.7 9 The character of the party
with custody is considered of highest importance, although mere
fault of a party may not be important unless the fault seriously
reflects upon that party's character. Examples are the cases of
divorce on the grounds of adultery or desertion. 8 0
Two recent cases provide excellent illustrations of the inter-
relationship of character and fault contributing to the marriage
break-up. In Donoko v. Donoko, 181 the lower court's judgment
granting custody to the father was affirmed, the overriding reason
appearing to be the indifference of the mother to the husband
and children, although there was some proof of infidelity on the
part of the mother. In Harper v. Harperl 2 the father was given
custody because the mother was "running around."
To be compared with these cases are those which deny custody
because of mental illness,8 3 although, of course, fault plays no
part.
Third Parties against Natural Parents- In line with an ap-
'75 Kirk v. Kirk, 240 S.W.2d 598 (Ky. 1951); Crowe v. Crowe, 264 Ky. 603.
95 S.W.2d (1936); Logsdon v. Logsdon, 204 Ky. 104, 263 S.W. 728 (1924).
176 McDaniel v. McDaniel, 383 S.W.2d 344 (Ky. 1964).
177 Schwartz v. Schwartz, 382 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1964).
178 Shehan v. Shehan, 152 Ky. 191, 153 S.W.243 (1913).
179 Numerous cases continue to reiterate the point that a child of tender
years is to be placed in the custody of the mother if she is morally fit; Futrell
v. Futrell, 346 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1961); Hatfield v. Derossett, 339 S.W.2d 631 (Ky.
1961); McLemore v. McLemore, 346 S.W.2d 122 (Ky. 1961); Clay v. Clay, 334
S.W.2d 909 (Ky. 1960); Merriman v. Selvey, 296 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1960); Estes
v. Estes, 299 S.W.2d 785 (Ky. 1957); Somerville v. Somerville, 306 S.W.2d 301
(Ky. 1957); Renfro v. Renfro, 290 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1956). The age beolw which
a child is "of tender years" seems to be ten or twelve, and may vary according to
the sex of the child. For a case holding that boys of ten or twelve are not
children of tender years, see Nichol v. Conlon, 385 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1965).
180 McQueen v. McQueen, 294 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. 1956) (refused custody to
mother because of her lewd and lascivious conduct).
181357 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 1962).
182344 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1961).
1
8 3 Day v. Day, 347 S.W.2d 549 (Ky. 1961); Snider v. Snider, 302 S.W.2d
612 (Ky. 1957).
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parent trend in other states, the Kentucky courts have adjudicated
an increasing number of cases in which an award of custody to a
third party other than the parents has been made over strong op-
position of one of the parents seeking custody. 84
Understandably there remains some preference shown to the
natural parent, who is not apt to be deprived of custody unless
clearly shown to be unfit.5 5 In one case a great-aunt received
custody against the wishes of a grandparent on special circum-
stances appearing that the child would be able to enjoy what
amounted to the partial custody of its mother under the arrange-
ment made.SO Although divided custody continues to be frown-
ed upon as not ordinarily in the child's best interest, 1s several
recent cases have affirmed convenient arrangements for divided
custody, say for the school year or for monthly periods prior to
the child's reaching school age. 8
Jurisdiction in Custody Cases-There have been several in-
teresting cases on jurisdiction enabling courts to make custody
awards. As pointed out in the previous article, the cases continue
to base custody jurisdiction upon domicile or physical presence of
the child within the state. 89 Even the divorcing court which
originally asserted jurisdiction over custody of children in con-
nection with its decree of divorce may decline to act further where
184 Roberson v. Wells, 355 S.W.2d 675 (Ky. 1962). Bonilla v. Bonilla, 335
S.A.2d 572 (Ky. 1960) (where maternal grandmother allowed to keep custody
over father's petition); McCormack v. Lewis, 328 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1959)
(where paternal grandmother allowed to keep custody over mother's petition);
Riggle v. Rhaten, 319 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. 1959) (where mother's petition for writ
of habeas corpus dismissed leaving custody of child with paternal grandparents);
Shaw v. Graham, 310 S.W.2d 522 (Ky. 1958) (where judgment leaving custody
with paternal grandmother over mother's petition affirmed); White v. England,
348 S.W.2d 936 (Ky. 1961) (dictum).
'
85 Pickett v. Farrow, 340 M.W.2d 462 (Ky. 1960). See Berry v. Berry, 386
S.W.2d 951 (Ky. 1965) and Goff v. Goff, 323 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1959). In the
latter case KRS 405.020, vhich provides in part that the surviving parent, if suited,
shall have the custody of the minor children, was construed to give a parent a
prima facie right to custody, and held that the parent does not have the burden
of proving his suitability. This shows some preference to the natural parent in
that the third party does not have in his favor this presumption of suitability in
child custody cases.
186 Guess v. Glenn, 294 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1956).
187 McLemore v. McLemore, 346 S.W.2d 722 (Ky. 1961).
IssBarrier v. Brewster, 349 S.W.2d 823 (Ky. 1961). Maxwell v. Maxwell,
351 S.W.2d 192 (Ky. 1961); Babb v. Babb. 293 S.W.2d 728 (Ky. 1956); Conlan
v. Conlan, 293 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1956); Sharp v. Sharp, 283 S.W.2d 172 (Ky.
1955) (divided custody not unreasonable).
18944 Ky. L. J. 60, 72 (1955). For a similar rule basing proper venue on
physical presence of the child in the country, see Balentine v. Goodin, 338
S.W.2d 702 (Ky. 1960).
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the child has subsequently been removed from the state. As the
Kentucky courts have previously put it, the divorcing court which
originally asserted jurisdiction over the custody of children of
the marriage loses jurisdiction when the child is removed from
the state, unless the removal is in violation of the court's decree
or for the purpose of escaping its jurisdiction. 190 In a recent Ken-
tucky case the court which had previously granted the original
custody award invoked its discretionary lack of jurisdiction
(forum non conveniens) to decline to enter an order affecting
custody after the ex-wife had taken the child to Indiana.191 Since
the mother, father, and child had all become residents of Indiana,
the case was distinguishable from those where one of the parties
seeks to evade jurisdiction of the Kentucky court by removing
the child to another state. Granting that the Kentucky court
technically had jurisdiction, the appellate court considered that
the chancellor in his discretion properly declined to act in view
of the difficulty of enforcing his order and the availability of
appropriate relief in the Indiana courts.
In Dahe v. Timmons'92 the Court of Appeals held that it must
give full faith and credit to a Georgia divorce decree which
awarded the custody to the father during the school months and
to the mother during the summer months (by agreement). Still
later the court gave full faith and credit to a Texas decree
awarding custody for nine months to the Texas grandparents and
compelled its obedience by habeas corpus proceeding.193 Habeas
corpus continues to be held a proper remedy to determine the
right to present possession of a child, say, under a presently extant
court decree.194 However, when the task before the court is in-
stead the determination of the permanent location of responsi-
bility for custody of the child, habeas corpus is not the proper
190 Id. at 72; Beutel v. Beutel, 305 Ky. 683, 205 S.W.2d 489 (1947). Hence
decisions continue to hold a custody award by state where the child is not
present is not entitled to full faith and credit (whether or not connected with a
divorce action there): Rice v. Rice, 316 S.W.2d 329 (Mo. 1958); Cf. Burden v.
Burden, 313 S.W.2d 566 (Tenn. 1958) (Tennessee Court refused to follow Ohio
Court decree awarding custody to father where child was with mother outside of
Ohio).
191 Carter v. Netherton, 302 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1957).
192 283 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1955).
193 Burke v. Burke, 356 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1962).
194 Burke v. Burke, supra note 193; Pickett v. Farrow, 340 S.W.2d 462 (Ky.
1958); Shaw v. Graham, 310 S.W.2d 522 (Ky. 1958); Merriman v. Selvey, 296
S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1956); Dake v. Timmons, 283 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1955).
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procedure. The matter should instead be brought to the consider-
ation of the court by a petition in equity seeking to determine
the issue upon the basis of the child's welfare.19
Perhaps the most interesting child custody case involved the
jurisdiction of a Kentucky court to make a decree concerning
a minor child visiting with her father on the Fort Knox Military
Reservation."9 The father sought to modify the previous award
of custody to the mother by the divorcing court in Nevada on the
ground of change of conditions, basing jurisdiction upon physical
presence of the child within Kentucky's boundaries. The court
declined jurisdiction because persons within a United States
military reservation are not within the jurisdiction of Kentucky
courts. The statute passed in 1952 providing the Kentucky
circuit courts with jurisdiction over divorce actions brought by
residents of United States reservations in counties adjacent to the
reservation was held not applicable. The only possible remedy
available to the mother in New Jersey was in the federal courts.
ADOPTION
In 1962 the Kentucky legislature substantially altered the
adoption procedure of this state. An exhaustive examination of
the 1962 changes will not be conducted here since these have
been dealt with previously in both this publication and the
Journal of Family Law. 9 7 A brief summary of the statutory modif-
ications and a few observations will be sufficient for the purposes
of this article.
The recent statutory amendments were made to prevent un-
scrupulous persons from placing babies in homes without regard
for the welfare of any interested parties and thereby eliminate
"black market" operations. In this the law seems to have achieved
a triumphant success.' 98 The statutes which become effective in
1962 basically provide that before a petition can be filed the child
must have been placed for adoption by a licensed child -placing
19 5Merriman v. Selvey, supra note 194.
190 Lathey v. Lathey, 305 S.W.2d 920 (Ky. 1957).
197 Mtichel, Kentucky Law Relating to the Placement of Children for
Adoption, 53 Ky. L. J. 223 (1965); Mitchell, The 1962 Kentucky Adoption Law,
3 J. Family Law 48 (1963).
198 Mitchell, Kentucky Law Relating to the Placement of Children for
Adoption, supra note 197.
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institution or agency or by the Kentucky Department of Child
Welfare. As an alternative the written approval of the Kentucky
Commissioner of Child Welfare will suffice.199 There are three
instances in which neither of the above three methods of approval
are necessary. These are as follows: (1) "A child sought to be
adopted by a step-parent, grandparents, sister, brother, aunt or
uncle"; 20 (2) "A child received by the proposed adopting parent
or parents from an agency without this state with the written con-
sent of the Commissioner"; 20 1 or (3) "those children placed for
adoption prior to the effective date of the amendments." 202 Prior
to 1962 there did not have to be any notification given to the
Kentucky Department of Child Welfare until after the adoption
petition had been filed.
Partially as a result of the statutory change there has been an
increasingly higher percentage of agency adoptions (where the
child is placed by a licensed child-placing agency or a state
adoption agency) with a corresponding decrease in independent
adoptions (where individuals place the child for adoption).203
Since adoption is a statutory creation, the announced policy
has been one of strict compliance with the statute as a require-
ment,20 4 even to the point of invalidating an adoption because of
the failure to have the written consent of the natural parent
notarized.2 05
The strict construction of statutory adoption is illustrated
further by several recent cases interpreting the statutory exceptions
to the requirement of consent by the natural parent or parents.
The Court of Appeals in two cases reversed the granting of the
adoption where the natural parent did not consent and was at
most guilty of neglect falling short of facts dispensing with the
necessity of consent.206 The natural parents' consent must be
obtained unless they have (a) "abandoned or deserted the child,"
(b) "substantially and continuously or repeatedly refused, or
being able have neglected, to give the child parental care and
199 KRS 199.470(4).200 KRS 199.470(4) (a).2 0 1 KRS 199.470(4) (b).2 02 KRS 199.470(5).
203 Mitchell, supra note 198204 Stanfield v. Willoughby, 286 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1956).205 I-iggason v. Henry, 313 S.W.2d 275 (Ky. 1958).206.Touett v. Rhorer, 339 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1960); Kantorwicz v. Reams, 332
S.W.2d 269 Ky. 1960).
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protection," or (c) "been adjudged mentally incompetent to
retain their parental right.., for not less than one year" coupled
with neglect of the child.20 7 These are the grounds for an order
terminating parental rights under the statute, and if such parental
rights have not already been terminated, the termination must be
placed and proved in the adoption proceeding itself as a condition
for adoption. Proof of one of these facts in relation to the natural
father of a child was held necessary in a petition by the stepfather
to adopt the child even though a court in granting the mother
(who had since married the stepfather) a divorce from the natural
father had awarded the mother custody without express reserva-
tion of either a right of visitation or a duty of support in the
father.208  The court's holding seems justified by the statutory
language dispensing with the necessity of consent as follows:
"(c) the living parents are divorced and the parental rights of
one parent have been terminated under KRS 199.600 and consent
has been given by the parent having custody and control of the
child." 09
Strict construction of adoption statutes seems all the more
justified when one considers the complete and final effect of
adoption. This finality is brought home in the Jouett21 case by
the court's calling attention to the error of the adopting court in
permitting visitation by the natural parent after adoption. By
way of contrast with court orders determining custody, adoption
is purely statutory, whereas custody is of equitable cognizance;
adoption is final while custody awards are subject to modification;
and adoption is purely statutory and to be strictly construed, but
jurisdiction over custody of minor children is of equitable
cognizance.
There is a statutory pronouncement in Kentucky that adults
can be adopted in the same manner as children.2 1' Unless there
is a contrary intent expressed in the will, adopted children will
207 KRS 199.600.20 8
.Touett v. Rhorer, 839 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1960); Matter of Anonymous, 28
Misc. 2d 577, 197 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1960); but contrast Matter of Adoption of
Candell, 54 WVash.2d 276, 340 P.2d 179 (1959), holding natural father's consent
to be unnecessary when divorce decree bad awarded mother custody without
express menton of custody or visitation rights. The Kentucky and New York
position seems preferable.
2o9 KRS 199.500(1)(c).
21O.Touett v. Rhorer, 839 S.V.2d 865 (Ky. 1960).
211 KRS 405.890.
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inherit through as well as from the parent who adopted them.21 2
The status of an adopted child for inheritance purposes then is
the same as if he or she were the natural child.213 This situation
of the law left open the door for the peculiar case of Bedinger v.
Graybill's Ex'r & Trustee,214 a case which is the subject of an
extensive note by Glenn L. Greene, Jr.2 15 There it was held that
a man could adopt his wife, and the adoption made her his
"heir at law" under the terms of an earlier will of his mother.
Since the court only considered the adoption for the purpose of
inheritance, it did not have to face the problem of incest from a
view of relationship. The question then becomes what will
constitute a contrary intent where one spouse adopts another. If
the testator uses words of legal import such as "heir," "heirs," or
"heirs at law," then the adopted spouse will inherit through the
other spouse.216 But if the testator uses such terms as "child," or
"children," which are not legal words, then the adopted spouse
will not inherit through the other spouse.217 The line is drawn
between legal relationships and those that are merely social.
In the cases where there have been changes in the adoption
statutes the problem of which one is to be deemed applicable has
arisen. In determining whether an adopted child comes within
the class of remaindermen who are to take upon termination of the
life estate, it has been decided that the adoption statutes in effect
at the time of the termination of the life estate control and not
the statute in effect at the time of the testaor's death.218
To be compared with inheritance by an adopted child is in-
heritance by an illegitimate child. A bastard is defined as a child
conceived and born out of wedlock.219 Under this statute a child
conceived before marriage but born after marriage is born in wed-
lock and therefore legitimate. If the child is conceived in wedlock
but born after the death of the father or dissolution of the mar-
riage by divorce, the child is legitimate. An illegitimate child
212 Major v. Kammer, 258 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1953).
=
3 5ailey v. Wireman, 240 S.W.2d 600 (Ky. 1951).
214 302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957).
215 Note, 47 Ky. L. J. 149 (1958).
216 Bedinger v. Graybill's Ex'r & Trustee, 302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957).
2 17Pennington v. Citizen's Fid. Bank & Trust Co., 390 S.W.2d 671 (Ky.
1965).
218 Brecldnridge v. Skillman's Trustee, 330 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1960); Edmands
v. Tice, 324 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1959).219KRS 406.010.
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inherits only from the mother.220 The major consequence of
illegitimacy, the incapacity to inherit from the father, is illustrated
by a recent case221 where the illegitimate daughter claimed a
child's portion of her father's estate despite illegitimacy by virtue
of a special agreement which the father was asserted to have made
with the mother that she would be willed the property or entitled
to inherit as a child. There is a very strong presumption that a
child conceived during wedlock is the child of the husband.222
In order to rebut the presumption complete non-access or com-
plete impotency of the husband must be shown.
One of the more interesting problems in the adoption field is
the extent to which religion should be considered in a determina-
tion upon a petition for adoption. The statutes that have made
pronouncements upon this matter are usually couched in slippery
words.'2123 Consequently, the language has been interpreted in
various ways. One way is to give effect to the religious difference
when it does not interfere with the best interests of the child.224 On
the other hand it is possible to allow the religious differences to
control.225 Yet another court has established the view that the
legislature intended to give preference to persons of the same
religion who are otherwise qualified to promote the welfare of the
child.220 The statute in Kentucky, which has not yet been
interpreted, provides "that no placement shall be disapproved on
the basis of the religious, ethnic, or inter-faith background of the
adoptive applicant, if such placement is made with the consent
of the parent.. .. ,,227
CONCLUSION
The past decade of domestic relations law in Kentucky is
characterized by stability and moderation. Of course there have
been judicial and legislative changes, but no radical departure
from precedent.
There are some signs of change. The 1954 Kentucky General
220 S91.090(2).
221 Napier v. Hodge. 293 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1956).
-
22Bradshawv v. Bradshaw, 295 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1956).
223M11. Rev. Stat ch. 4, see. 4-2 (1955) (whenever possible); Mass Ann.
Laws ch. 210 see. 5B (1955) (whenever practicable).2 2 4 1n re Duren, 355 Mo. 1222, 200 S.W.2d 343 (1947).
2 25Petition of Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954).
220Cooper v. Hinrichs, 10 MII. 2d 269, 140 N.E.2d 293 (1957).
227 KRS 199.470(6).
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Assembly made a beginning by directing the Judicial Council to
make a thorough investigation of existing divorce law and of
family courts, to be coordinated with studies of the entire court
structure, but no substantial legislation along these lines has yet
resulted.28 In 1956, Kentucky's legislation permitting the fiscal
court of any county to appoint a friend of the court was broadened
and strengthened.22 The Constitution Review Commission is
presently considering some revision of the Kentucky judicial
system to achieve reform in the judicial agencies with responsibi-
lity in family matters. The current volume of the Kentucky Law
Journal contains articles discussing the merits of various reforms
in family law.280
Kentucky's divorce laws are not extreme compared with most
states. In regard both to the grounds required for divorce and the
residence requirements for out-of-state applicants, Kentucky takes
a representative middle stand somewhere between New York,
where divorce is extremely difficult, and certain other states where
residents and non-residents alike can procure a divorce on minimal
grounds. The unreality of resolving marital problems through the
adversary system of grounds and defenses in divorce proceedings
has been pointed out. The grounds alleged are more often
symptoms which have arisen after the marriage has failed rather
than the underlying cause of the conflict. Proposals have been
made to substitute other procedures for settling marital conflicts
by the courts with the aid of non-legal specialists in family
relations. 231
In some other states, family courts, with jurisdiction over all
aspects of the family, have operated for years, with bench and
bar cooperating successfully with other disciplines in such mat-
ters as marriage counselling and family clinics. Because of the
significance of the family as an integrated social-political insti-
tution, socio-economic considerations are of utmost importance.
Certainly closer cooperation between lawyers and social workers
is to be anticipated.2 2
228 See, Ky. Acts 1954, ch. 281, at 702; Ky. Acts 1954, ch. 268, at 689. See
also, 0omment, 46 Ky. L. J. 114 (1957).229KRS 409.090 (1956).
23054 Ky. L. J. 209-66 (1965).231 Bradway, Collusion and the Public Interest in the Law of Divorce, 47
Cornell L. Q. 374 (1962).
282 Foster, The Law and Social Work, 53 Ky. L. J. 229 (1965).
